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Introduction
The size of government (i.e., the share of government spending in relation to a country's GDP) is an important macroeconomic variable. For instance, by increasing the burden of taxation and crowding out private economic activity and investment, government size has been found to negatively affect factor accumulation and productivity (e.g., Dar and AmirKhalkhali, 2002) .
Consequently, empirical studies on the determinants of economic growth often report a negative correlation between economic growth and government size (for a review, see Bergh and Henrekson, 2011) . In addition to depressing economic activity, government size may have further unfavorable effects on the social life. For instance, Bjornskov et al. (2007) show that excessive government consumption is detrimental to life satisfaction.
Given its potentially substantial socio-economic ramifications, a considerable amount of theoretical and empirical contributions has aimed at identifying the determinants of government size (for a brief review, see Shelton, 2007 Shelton, : 2234 Shelton, -2240 . Here, population size has been named as a potentially important determinant. A priori, however, its effect on government size is unclear.
For one, there are a number of advantages that allow larger countries to potentially afford smaller governments. First, larger countries can capitalize on scale economies associated with the provision of public goods (Alesina, 2003) . For instance, Andrews and Boyne (2009) show that (per capita) administrative costs are lower in larger local governments for a sample of English communities, indeed implying economies of scale. That is, fixed costs of public goods and increasing returns to scale favor larger countries, making it possible to allocate fewer resources (in relation to total GDP) to public spending. Second, larger countries are less likely to be threatened by foreign aggression, given that their sheer size discourages war (Alesina, 2003) . This in turn allows larger countries to spend less on defense and security, again negatively affecting government size. Third, larger countries benefit from comparatively larger domestic markets, creating fewer incentives to engage in international trade and competition. Thus, larger countries are less exposed to the volatility and external risk openness usually carries (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998) . By contrast, more open (i.e., smaller) economies face more risk; they consequently have to use government spending in the form of social insurance to mitigate associated risks,, increasing the size of government (Rodrik, 1998) . 3 For another, however, population size may also have effects that ultimately lead to an increase in government size. First, the benefits of size (primarily, scale economies) may decrease when public goods provided by government spending are subject to congestion (e.g., Oakland, 1972) . For instance, congestion is expected to incur administrative costs when congestion leads to the rationing of public goods (Oakland, 1972) . Consequently, the costs of managing congestion may offset or even outweigh the advantages of size in the form of scale economies. Second, and more importantly, larger population size also predicts more violent social conflict. For instance, increases in population size are expected to result in more conflict by exacerbating resource scarcity and distributional conflicts as well as environmental degradation (e.g., Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Brückner, 2010) . Indeed, larger population size is a strong positive predictor of civil war risk (for a review, see Blattman and Miguel, 2010) and terrorism (for a review, see Krieger and Meierrieks 2011) . For instance, the instrumental-variable estimates of Brückner (2010) suggest that increases in population size lead to higher risk of civil conflict for a panel of 37 SubSaharan countries over the period . In turn, the increased risk of conflict due to large population size can be expected to increase government size. First, there may be higher public spending (compared to smaller countries) on security and the military to suppress conflict. Second, increased government spending on social policies (education, health, social security etc.) may be used to accommodate grievances that arise due to population pressures so as to counter the risk of rebellion. For instance, Krieger and Meierrieks (2010) and Taydas and Peksen (2012) show that governments can indeed buy internal peace by increasing public spending on welfare policies.
In sum, economic theory is ambiguous about the effect of population size on government size. This ambiguity is also reflected in the empirical evidence. For one, in their seminal analysis Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) find that country size is negatively associated with government size.
A similar result is obtained by Benarroch and Pandey (2008) . Shelton (2007) also finds that government spending tends to decrease with population size. By contrast, Ram (2009) finds that while population size is negatively related to government size in a pooled OLS setting (thus mimicking the approach of Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998) , the relationship between both variables is positive in a fixed-effects setting. Similarly, Jetter and Parmeter (2015) find that the effect of population size on government size is dependent on empirical choices (e.g., considering the use of specific methods and datasets). Finally, Rodrik (1998) reports no statistically significant association between population size and government size. 4 This paper aims at adding to the diverse evidence on the government size-population size nexus.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we investigate the relationship between government and population size using "traditional" pooled OLS and fixed-effects approaches, thus following the examples of earlier empirical studies discussed above. As a first contribution to the literature, we empirically uncover several methodological shortcomings associated with this "traditional" approach, especially with respect to the roles of cross-sectional dependence, non-stationarity and cointegration as well as slope (parameter) heterogeneity. As a second contribution to the literature, to address these shortcomings we use a novel empirical panel time-series approach (the common correlated effects mean-group error-correction model). The estimates from this approach are presented in Section 3 and indicate that larger population size is positively related to government size, suggesting that the social conflict channel (where more population size leads to larger governments) dominates other channels (e.g., the scale economies channel) through which more population size would lead to smaller governments. This finding is buttressed by a sub-sample analysis indicating that the positive effect of population size on government size especially matters to ethnically fragmented societies (in which social conflict ought to be more rampant). Section 4 concludes.
Pooled OLS and Fixed-Effects Regressions
For the following empirical analyses we use balanced panel data for 130 countries for the 1970-2014 period. The summary statistics are reported in Table 1 . A country list is provided in the appendix.
- Table 1 here-
Empirical Model and Data
As in previous empirical efforts such as Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) , Ram (2009) and Jetter and Parmeter (2015) , we begin our empirical analysis by considering a series of empirical models of the following form:
This model includes an intercept (α0) and an idiosyncratic error term (ε). Most importantly to us, it relates an indicator of government size (GOV) to an indicator of population size (POP) for country i at year t. Here, government size is measured as the (logged) share of government 5 consumption at current PPPs, while population size is a county's (logged) population size in millions; these measures were also used by earlier empirical studies on the nexus between government and population size (e.g., Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998; Ram, 2009; Jetter and Parmeter, 2015) . Both data series are drawn from the Penn World Table (version 9.0) (Feenstra et al., 2015) ; they are log-transformed to remain comparable to these previous studies and be less affected by outliers. (Shelton, 2007) . Second, we control for the (logged) age dependency ratio (defined as the ratio of dependents, i.e., people younger than 15 or older than 64 to those aged 15-64), using data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2016) . We expect countries with a larger dependency ratio to have larger governments. For instance, Sanz and Velázquez (2007) show that aging was the main driving force of the growth of government spending in the OECD countries between 1970 and 1998, potentially due to increasing public spending on health, pensions and other forms of social welfare.
With respect to the model represented in (1), we implicitly assume that the estimates are not affected by cross-sectional dependence, that the residuals (εt) produced by (1) are stationary and that population size affects government size uniformly for all countries in the sample (slope homogeneity). As we discuss below, these assumptions may not be justified; if violations of these assumptions are not accounted for, the empirical results from model (1) may be misleading.
1 Also, it is well-known that first-differences of log-transformed data series approximate their growth rates, facilitating the interpretation of results when first-differences are taken. 2 We also experiment with other controls (e.g., for trade openness or urbanization). Using these controls, however, does not change the main results of our paper.
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Cross-Sectional Dependence. Cross-sectional dependence refers to the interdependency of variables of interest between countries, where this interdependency may be due to, e.g. common shocks (e.g., economic booms or recessions) or spillover effects (Sarafidis and Wansbeek, 2012 ).
For our case, population size may be correlated across countries due to, e.g., international migration or the diffusion of medical technology, while government size may exhibit crosssectional dependence due to, e.g., tax competition or regional arms races. If not accounted for, cross-sectional dependence in the panel data may lead to correlation in the residuals, consequently affecting estimation efficiency and the validity of inference (Sarafidis and Wansbeek, 2012) . shown in a pioneering study by Granger and Newbold (1974) in the context of time-series data.
Here, especially significance tests on the regression coefficients are invalid in the presence of spurious regression (Granger and Newbold, 1974; Kao, 1999) . That is, when regression models include non-stationary variables, it is possible that significance tests indicate a "significant" relationship between variables when it does not actually exist. Importantly, the problem of spurious regression also matters to the panel setting (e.g., Kao, 1999) .
Slope Heterogeneity. A final assumption of model (1) that can be challenged is the assumption of slope homogeneity. This assumption would suggest that α1=ai for all i in model (1). Indeed, Pesaran and Smith (1995) argue that this assumption is almost always rejected in empirical practice. Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that the incorrect assumption of slope homogeneity produces inconsistent and potentially misleading estimates of the regression coefficients; they instead argue in favor of estimation methods-as used by us in Section 3-that allow for parameter 7 heterogeneity. 4 For our case, assuming parameter homogeneity implies that population size has a uniform effect on government size over all countries considered. Clearly, this is a strong assumption. For instance, in the introduction we argued that an increase in population size could result in more social spending (i.e., larger government size) to accommodate grievances due to increased population pressure. However, there are systematic differences in preferences regarding welfare spending and redistribution (both of which are expected to increase government size)
between countries (e.g., Corneo and Grüner, 2002) . These differences could result in heterogeneous responses with respect to changes in population size, where countries in which redistribution is favored may expand the government more strongly.
Tests for Panel Unit Roots and Cross-Sectional Dependence
Before we run model (1), we investigate whether the main data series of interest (government and population size) are affected by non-stationarity and cross-sectional dependence. Given that these issues are not accommodated for in model (1), they are likely to be "captured"-if indeed present-in the regression residuals (i.e., the εt series), leading to misspecification issues and potentially incorrect inferences.
We employ two different panel unit tests to assess whether the data series are non-stationary, the Im-Pesaran-Shin test (IPS test) (Im et al., 2003) and the CADF test developed by Pesaran (2007) .
For both tests, the null hypothesis is that the investigated series contains unit roots (i.e., it is nonstationary) versus the alternative that (a fraction of) the series are stationary. Importantly, both tests account for cross-sectional dependence. First, the IPS test does so by demeaning the data.
Second, the CADF test amends the standard augmented Dickey-Fuller regressions used to investigate non-stationarity by cross-section averages of lagged levels and first-differences of the investigated series.
As shown in Table 2 , the panel unit root tests indicate that both data series are non-stationary in levels but stationary after first-differences have been taken. These findings are highly intuitive. 4 In a fixed-effects model we allow for unobserved heterogeneity through the intercept. However, this heterogeneity is necessarily time-invariant and independent of the explanatory variables. By contrast, allowing for heterogeneity in the slope parameters also allows us to consider other (more complex) forms of heterogeneity. Kirk, 1996) . Second, trends towards larger governments have also been discussed in the literature, e.g., by Peltzman (1980) and Holcombe (2005) . For instance, ratchet effects (where government size grows during times of crises but does not revert back to pre-crisis levels once the crisis is over) may explain a positive trending in government size (Holcombe, 2005 ).
- Table 2 here-
We also test whether the data series are affected by cross-sectional dependence. We employ Pesaran's (2004) CD-test, which tests the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence against the alternative of cross-sectional dependence. Importantly, the CD-test is robust to non-stationarity and parameter heterogeneity (Pesaran, 2004) , both of which may also matter to the variables we examine.
As shown in Table 2 , both data series are indeed affected by cross-sectional dependence, meaning that observations for government and population size are not independent across countries. As argued above, such interdependencies may be explained by exposure to, e.g., common shocks or spillover effects. For example, economic crises that transcend national boundaries, international migration, international economic integration and politico-economic cooperation, competition or hostilities between nation-states may play a role in this context.
Pooled OLS and Fixed-Effects Regressions Results
The pre-tests reported in Table 2 already suggest that running model (1) without considering nonstationarity and cross-sectional dependence may be inappropriate. For the sake of comparability with previous empirical efforts on the government size-population size nexus (e.g., Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998; Ram, 2009; Jetter and Parmeter, 2015) , we nevertheless run the regression model characterized by equation (1) using the pooled OLS and fixed-effects estimator. The results are reported in Table 3 . In short, regardless of which method is chosen and which specification is run, we find that country size exerts a negative and statistically significant effect on government size; 9 the estimated effects are much larger in the fixed-effects setting. These results would be consistent with the arguments of Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) and Alesina (2003) regarding various benefits of country size and their potential (negative) effects on the size of government, e.g., in the form of scale economies or lower risk from an exposure to international markets.
- Table 3 hereHowever, in Table 3 we also report diagnostics related to the assumptions we discussed above (cross-sectional independence, stationary residuals and slope homogeneity). First, tests of the regression residuals for unit root presence very strongly indicate that the residuals are nonstationary. 5 As discussed above, non-stationary residuals may imply a spurious regression (e.g., Kao, 1999) . Second, the majority of CD-test results indicate that the residuals are affected by crosssectional dependence. 6 As hinted at above, this may affect the validity of inference (Sarafidis and Wansbeek, 2012) . Finally, we also test whether the assumption of slope homogeneity is justified. Baltagi (1981) recommends the Roy-Zellner test over the better known Chow test to examine the null hypothesis of poolability (so that population size has a uniform effect on government size for all countries in the sample) against the alternative that pooling is not appropriate (so that parameter heterogeneity should be allowed for). As reported in Table 3 , the null of slope homogeneity of the Roy-Zellner test is always strongly rejected. 7 The incorrect assumption of slope homogeneity may yield inconsistent and potentially misleading estimates of the regression coefficients (Pesaran and Smith, 1995) . In sum, the regression diagnostics strongly suggest that the results reported in Table   3 may be affected by various sources of misspecification.
Panel Time-Series Approach
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Given that the "traditional" approach to examine the relationship between government and population size in a pooled OLS or fixed-effects setting is likely to suffer from specification issues, producing (potentially) misleading results, in this section we rely on a modelling approach that is able to account for cross-sectional dependence and allow for slope (parameter) heterogeneity as well as to produce stationary residuals while accounting for a long-run (cointegrating) relationship between population and government size. In detail, we use a panel time-series approach of Pesaran (2006) and Chudik and Pesaran (2015) , the (dynamic) common correlated effects mean-group error-correction model. 
Empirical Model
As a first step, we account for the issue of non-stationarity. As shown in Table 2 , population size and government size are integrated of the same order. When this is the case, a cointegration approach is feasible (Engle and Grange, 1987) . Cointegration refers to the situation when a stationary linear combination of two non-stationary variables exists; cointegration analysis allows for inferences about the long-run relationship between non-stationary variables (Engle and Grange, 1987) . We incorporate the idea of cointegration into our empirical model by considering the following error-correction model (ECM):
Here, government size and population size are first-differenced (indicated by the first-difference operator ∆) to achieve stationarity; the regression coefficients associated with the first-differences allows us to evaluate the short-run dynamics of the model. Besides the intercept (α0) and wellbehaved error term (εit), equation (2) also includes the error-correction term ρ (GOVi, which corresponds to the stationary linear combination of the levels of government and population size and allows us to examine the long-run relationship between these variables.
We can reparametrize equation (2) to:
8 An informative introduction to and application of this empirical method is provided by Eberharrdt As a final step, we allow for parameter heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence, arriving at:
Regarding (4), a number of remarks are necessary:
(i) Parameter heterogeneity is accounted for in model (4) through the mean-group approach of Pesaran and Smith (1995) . That is, we allow the various parameters to be estimated to vary by country i (while they were constrained to be equal across countries in equations (2) and (3)). To arrive at the mean-group estimates, we first estimate a series of country-specific regressions and then average the estimated coefficients across countries. The associated standard errors are derived non-parametrically following Pesaran and Smith (1995) .
(ii) Combining the first and second line of equation (4) gives Pesaran's (2006) common correlated effects estimator. The terms in the second line are cross-sectional averages of all variables in the model. 9 As shown by Pesaran (2006) , the inclusion of these averages can accommodate crosssectional dependence, providing consistent estimates of the parameters in the first line of equation 9 Without the inclusion of cross-sectional averages, the model represented in equation (4) is equivalent to the simple mean-group model of Pesaran and Smith (1995) .
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(4) that are robust to unobserved common factors (due to spillover effects, global politicoeconomic shocks etc.).
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(ii) Estimation equation (4) includes one lag of the dependent variable; also, further lags of the dependent variable (as well as of the explanatory variable) could be added to the model. This dynamic specification is expected to affect the consistency of the common correlated effects meangroup estimates (Chudik and Pesaran, 2015) . Chudik and Pesaran (2015) argue that by adding further lags of the cross-sectional averages, the common correlated effects mean-group estimators performs well again, even when allowing for weakly exogenous regressors in a dynamic setting.
These additional lags of the cross-sectional averages are indicated by the third line of equation (4).
(iv) Baltagi et al. (2000) argue that the assumption of parameter heterogeneity-even if warranted by poolability tests-may produce inferior results compared to a pooled approach. They suggest that the bias due to the incorrect assumption of parameter homogeneity needs to be weighed against the efficiency gains from pooling. This is why we also estimate equation (4) (Lütkepohl, 2007: 322) . As a robustness check, however, we also report one specification that includes our usual controls (per capital income and the age dependency ratio).
Empirical Results
The (dynamic) common correlated effects estimation results are reported in Table 4 . We are most interested in the long-run effect of population size on government size. This effect is calculated (and reported) in two ways. First, we report the long-run coefficient associated with the lag of the level of population size, which corresponds to the average coefficient of πi P from equation (4).
Second, we report the average long-run coefficient of population size, which is equal to βi= -πi P / πi EC (using the average coefficients) from equation (2); for this estimate, the standard errors, tstatistics and p-values are calculated using the Delta method. The results for both long-run estimates are quite similar and strongly indicate that population size exerts (on average) a longrun positive effect on government size. Considering our theoretical considerations, this suggests that population factors that promote government size (congestion and social conflict) are more important than factors that would negatively affect government size (scale economies, deterrence and trade/insurance effects). Notably, our finding is in stark contrast to our earlier findings using the "traditional" pooled OLS and fixed-effects approaches, where we found that population size decreases government size. Consequently, our findings also contrast with earlier empirical contributions on the government size-population size nexus. For instance, they are not in line with Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) who argue that scale economies lead to a negative association between population and government size.
- Table 4 hereContrary to the "traditional" estimates reported in Table 3 , the results reported in Table 4 are not affected by misspecification. First, we are almost always able to reject the CD-test null hypothesis of cross-sectional dependence. That is, introducing (lags of) cross-sectional averages can capture unobservables and account for cross-sectional dependence, as argued by Pesaran (2006) and Chudik and Pesaran (2015) . Second, the regressions residuals are always found to be stationary.
In addition to that, the cointegration tests always indicate that a cointegrating relationship exists, 14 with the cointegrating relationship being dynamically stable. Third, a mean-group (heterogeneous) modelling approach yields a smaller RMSE compared to a pooled (homogeneous) approach.
Following Baltagi et al. (2000) , this suggests that the mean-group approach is preferred over a pooled one.
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Considering the short-run effects, lags of (first-differenced) government size predict its present values. By contrast, there are no significant short-run effects of lags of population growth (i.e.,
first-differenced population size) on the growth of government. As similarly argued by Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015) , the lack of significance in short-run effects does not necessarily imply that population growth does not affect the growth of government; rather, the short-run relationship appears to be highly heterogeneous, with dynamics on average cancelling each other out.
Sub-Sample Analysis
In this subsection we want to assess whether the results of Table 4 also hold for specific subsamples that differ with respect to certain characteristics. For our analysis we consider three such characteristics which we discuss below in more detail:
(i) We investigate the role of ethnic fractionalization, using data by Alesina et al. (2003) . The fractionalization index of Alesina et al. (2003) reflects the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belong to different ethnic groups. Higher levels of ethnic fractionalization may result in more pronounced ethnic cleavages and a greater potential for social conflict, as also argued in, e.g., Alesina et al. (2003) and Esteban and Ray (2008) . Thus, it may be more likely that government size increases in response to population pressures to avoid social conflict (e.g., through increased public spending on security or social welfare) when ethnic fractionalization is high. Importantly, higher levels of ethnic fractionalization are not simply a function of country size. For our sample the correlation coefficient between the ethnic 11 This finding is also in line with the Roy-Zellner test results reported in Table 3 . Note that in Table 4 we only report (for the sake of brevity) one pooled-CCE regression result which we compare with an otherwise identically specified MG-CCE result, where the latter yields a smaller RMSE. However, we also compare all other (dynamic) MG-CCE models reported in Table 4 to their pooled counterparts; the calculated RMSE always suggest that a heterogeneous modelling approach is preferred over the homogeneous (pooled) one (results available upon request).
15 fractionalization index and population size is r=0.018 (p=0.16). Rose (2006) similarly reports that smaller countries are not necessarily more ethnically homogeneous.
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(ii) Second, we consider the level of population size itself. Potentially, there is a non-linear effect of population size on government size, so that the former only (positively) affects the latter when a certain threshold of government size has been reached. For instance, congestion costs (which are expected to increase with population size and stimulate government growth) may only matter for fairly large countries but be negligible up to a certain country size (Alesina, 2003) . Similarly, the risk of social conflict may not linearly increase in population size, as suggested by Esteban and Roy (2008) .
(iii) Finally, we consider the role of per capita income. For one, richer countries are less vulnerable to social conflict (Blattman and Miguel, 2010) . Thus, for richer countries the social conflict channel (through which population size would fuel government growth) may be less important.
For another, richer countries tend to be more open to international trade, e.g., as found in Ram (2009) ; increased exposure to trade may in turn create demand for higher government spending to insure against the risks of trade (Rodrik, 1998) . Finally, Wagner's law postulates that richer countries are more prone to government expansion (e.g., Shelton, 2007) , where richer countries are also expected to fund public goods (e.g., culture) for which scale effects may be less important.
In sum, differences in the scope and type of government activity may differ with a country's level of economic development, potentially also influencing how population size influences government size.
We run a series of common correlated effects mean-group estimations as specified in equation (4) for a number of sub-samples, where the sub-samples differ with respect to the characteristics outlined above. To create these sub-samples, we use the interquartile mean of the ethnic fractionalization, population size and per capita income data series. Relying on this mean provides some protection against outliers; at the same time, it allows us to split the sample into two subsamples of roughly equal size.
The empirical results are reported in Table 5 . First, the results suggest that in countries with an above-average level of ethnic fractionalization there is a positive long-run effect of population size on government size, while the same is not true for the sub-sample where ethnic fractionalization is smaller. Consistent with our expectations, this finding suggests that that government size is especially responsive to population pressures under such circumstances. For instance, this may be due to social conflict being more pronounced in highly fractionalized societies, leading to, e.g., more public spending on security or other public goods compared to less fractionalized countries.
Second, we find that population size only increases government size in countries with a population of more than 10 million inhabitants; for countries with less than 10 million inhabitants, there is no significant (positive or negative) long-run effect of population size on government size. This result may indicate that the detriments of population size (which consequently stimulate government growth) only materialize after a certain population threshold has been reached. Finally, we find that population size has a positive long-run effect on government size both for a sub-sample of comparatively rich and poor countries. Thus, a country's level of economic development does not seem to play an obvious role in moderating the government size-population size nexus.
- Table 5 here-
Conclusion
There are conflicting schools of thought regarding the effect of population size on government size. One school argues that larger countries benefit from scale economies and reduced exposure to the risks of international wars and trade and can thus afford smaller governments. Another school of thought argues that larger countries necessitate larger governments to counter congestion costs and the dangers of conflict, both of which increase with country size. Accordingly, a review of existing empirical studies shows that the evidence on the government size-population size nexus is mixed.
We re-examine this nexus using panel data for 130 countries for the 1970-2014 period. We argue that previous analyses of the effect of population size on government size are incorrectly specified 17 models by not properly accounting for cross-sectional dependence, non-stationarity and cointegration as well as parameter heterogeneity. Using a panel time-series approach that adequately considers and models these issues, we find that population size has a positive long-run effect on government size, suggesting that the detrimental effects of population size (more congestion, greater risk of social conflict) dominate its beneficial ones. We also show that this effect is especially important to countries that are vulnerable to social conflict due to ethnic heterogeneity and that exhibit a country size exceeding 10 million inhabitants.
Populations in many developing countries (especially in Africa, Asia and Latin America) are expected to grow substantially in the coming decades. In light of our findings, these countries cannot expect to see their government size shrink relative to their GDP as population size increases; rather, the opposite appears to be true. Given that many empirical studies suggest that (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** Notes: Dependent variable=ln(Government Size). Constant not reported. POLS=Pooled OLS estimation. FE=Fixed-effects estimation. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. ✝: Additional controls are per capita income and age dependency ratio (both logged). (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** CD-statistic Pesaran and Smith, 1995) in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. ✝: Additional controls are per capita income and age dependency ratio (both logged). Pesaran and Smith, 1995) in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. 
